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COMMENT

THE OSTRICH APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY-COURTSANCTIONED STATE DENIAL OF DEBTORS' LIEN
AVOIDANCE PRIVILEGE DEFEATS THE INTENT OF
CONGRESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1970 Congress began an eight-year effort to overhaul the federal bankruptcy system. 1 Congress was concerned that the then operative bankruptcy system was not fair and uniform.2 In effect the system
did not always rehabilitate, but often would devastate, the bankrupt
debtor, denying him or her any appreciable means with which to make
a fresh start.' The congressional commission that was established to
propose changes to the Bankruptcy Code reported" that rehabilitation
of a bankrupt debtor was a primary goal of a bankruptcy system.' The
commission believed that this goal could best be achieved through enactment of proposed section 4-503 (the predecessor of section
522)-the proposed exemption provision of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978.6
Congress supported the commission's objective and, in enacting
section 522(b)7 and 522(f) 8 of the code, implemented a mechanism
I. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
2. Id. The ideals embodied in the commission's report are expressions of this nation's judeochristian heritage. See, e.g., Matthew 18:23-35.
3. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 6087 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The report stated that:
[Today's exemption statutes] are outmoded, designed for more rural times, and hopelessly
inadequate to serve the needs of and provide a fresh start for modern urban debtors. The
historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a debtor from his creditors,
to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his
nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a public charge. The purpose
has not changed, but neither have the level of exemptions in many states. Thus, the purpose has largely been defeated.
Id.
4. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Part 1,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist. Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
5. Id. at 71.
6. Id., Part 11, at 125-27.
7. I1 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 353.
Section 522(b) provides as follows:
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purportedly designed to rehabilitate bankrupt debtors.9 However, the
purpose of section 522 can be defeated"0 when states legislatively opt
out-as they are allowed to do under section 522(b)(1)n--of the federal scheme of exemptions,1 2 and then deny their respective citizens a
corresponding level of exemption. This failure to comply with congressional intent has been exacerbated by recent court decisions.1 These

Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1), or in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection. In joint cases filed under section 302 of this title and individual cases filed under section 301 or 303 of this title by or against debtors who are husband
and wife, and whose estates are ordered to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of
the Bankruptcy Rules, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (1)
and the other debtor elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2) of this subsection. If
the parties cannot agree on the alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect
paragraph (I), where such election is permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the
case is filed. Such property is(I) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law
that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does
not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of
this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition
at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately
preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day
period than in any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent
that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982). Section 522(f) provides that:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien
is(I) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for
the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the
trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
Id. Section 101 (27) of the act defines a judicial lien as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." Id. § 101(27).
9. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
10. See Hertz, Bankruptcy Code Exemptions: Notes on the Effect of State Law, 54 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 339 (1980).
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982).
11.
12. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Pine v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1711 (1984); McManus v. Avco Financial Services, Inc., 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
8.
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decisions hold that not only can a state deny its citizens use of the
federal scheme of exemptions, but that a state can also deny its citizens
key, rehabilitative, lien avoidance provisions which are statutorily separate from the federal scheme of exemptions.14 This matter is of concern
not only because these court rulings defeat the intent of Congress, but
also because United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have developed
conflicting positions on the issue of whether a state can deny lien avoidance power, as well as the federal scheme of exemptions, to its
15
citizens.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the development of
section 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and to analyze
current judicial interpretations of the viability of the section 522(f) lien
avoidance provisions after a state has opted out of the federal scheme
of exemptions. In making this evaluation, this comment will focus on
the legislative intent behind, and the statutory construction of, the act
as well as on how the courts have dealt with each of these.
Of special concern in this evaluation is the approach taken by the
bankruptcy courts in Ohio, which have upheld the viability of section
522(f)," despite the existence of Ohio legislation denying the exemption. 7 Two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have taken the
opposite position, holding that the application of section 522(f) lien
avoidances is nullified when a state has opted out of the federal scheme
of exemptions. 1 8 This comment will analyze the conflicting authorities
and ultimately conclude that the approach taken by the bankruptcy
courts in Ohio is the correct approach.

1982) (both courts holding that state statute could overpower the lien avoidance provisions of
section 522(f)).
14. See supra note 13.
15. See supra note 13. See also Maddox v. Southern Discount Co., 713 F.2d 1526, 1530
(11th Cir. 1983) (the court stating that if faced with the question, it might resolve the conflict
between state opt-out and section 522(f) viability opposite to the McManus and Pine holdings).
16. See, e.g., Flege v. Akron City Hosp., 17 Bankr. 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Phillips
v. Household Finance Corp., 13 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Bowles, 8 Bankr. 394
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
17. Section 2329.662 of the Ohio Revised Code provides as follows: "Pursuant to the 'Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,' 92 Stat. 2549, 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(1), this state specifically does not
authorize debtors who are domiciled in this state to exempt the property specified in the 'Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,' 92 Stat. 2549, 11 U.S.C. 522(d)." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.662
(Page 1981).
Section 2329.661(C) of the Ohio Revised Code states that: "Section 2329.66 of the Revised
Code does not affect or invalidate any sale, contract of sale, conditional sale, security interest, or
pledge of any personal property, or any lien created thereby." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2329.661(C) (Page 1981).
18. See cases cited supra note 13.
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BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

In 1970 Congress created the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws.1 9
The commission was created to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes" in bankruptcy law.20 In order to avoid arbitrary
change, the commission first determined the purpose or function of the
bankruptcy system and then recommended change.2 From the commission's perspective, there are two coequal functions of the bankruptcy system: (1) to provide orderliness for both creditor and debtor in
a modern, credit-based economy, and (2) to rehabilitate bankrupt debtors.2 2 Thus, the goals of the bankruptcy system stress the importance of
providing the debtor-creditor relationship with at least a quasi-standardized structure, and enabling debtors to survive a bankruptcy
discharge. 3
The bankruptcy system in effect at the time of the commission's
investigation was that promulgated by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,24
as amended in 1938.25 That system essentially left the determination of
a bankrupt debtor's future in the hands of the states; the amended
Bankruptcy Act did not preempt the states from controlling exemptions. 26 The commission determined that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
(as amended) created nonuniformity of treatment of bankrupt debtors.2 7 Differences in economic development and nonhomogeniety of na-

19. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
20. Id.
21. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4.
22. Id. at 71. The commission stated that there were two key functions of the bankruptcy
system:
The primaryfunction of the bankruptcy system is to continue the law-based orderliness of
the open credit economy in the event of a debtor's inability or unwillingness generally to
pay his debts. Especially from creditors' perspectives, it is important to have rules that
determine rights generally in the debtor's wealth, wherever situated, and thus guide conduct in the open credit economy, as well as the collective processes which effect such rules
and permit creditors to realize on their claims. Especially from debtors' perspectives it is
important to have sanctuary from the jungle of creditors' pursuit of their individualistic
collection efforts, both under law and outside of the law. Relief by way of stay of collection
may be all that is needed. It is equally important to be able to obtain authoritative relief,
through discharge, from the hardship of unpaid debts. The second function of the bankruptcy process, on a par with the first, is to rehabilitate debtors for continued and more
value-productive participation, i.e., to provide a meaningful "fresh start."
Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Act of June 22,
1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
25. Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
26. Id.
27. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4 at 169. The 1938 amendment to the 1898 Act provided that:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are pre-
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tionwide attitudes toward bankruptcy meant vast differences in each
state's approach toward rehabilitating the bankrupt debtor.28 Both
creditors and debtors were unhappy with the system-dissatisfaction
increased as the populace became more mobile and more aware of the
29
differences between the states' approaches to exemption levels.
The commission's analysis indicated that the goals of the bankruptcy system-orderliness in an open credit economy and rehabilitation of the bankrupt debtor-were not effectively being met by the
bankruptcy system established by the 1898 Act.3" Consequently, the
commission proposed a system of exemptions for the bankrupt debtor
which would be exclusively federal, centered upon those "kinds of property that traditionally have been treated as exempt by state governments [and limited by] appropriate federal maximums."31 The uniformity proposed by the commission would effectively "level" the
system of exemptions throughout the United States. Uniformity would
reduce exemptions of those states which were, in the commission's
opinion, excessively generous, and increase the exemption level of those
3
states which were especially parsimonious.

scribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws in force at the time of the
filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months
immediately preceeding the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months
than in any other State ....
Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 840, 847 (repealed 1978).
28. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 169. The report stated the following:
As a result of the present Act's deference to other federal and state law as to exemptions,
there is no uniformity of treatment of creditors and debtors, and the exemptions available
are not the result of reasoned policy but the happenstance of history and location. This is
intolerable for what is supposed to be a national, uniform system and destructive to the
goal of rehabilitation of individual debtors.
Id. It seems reasonable to conclude that the commission determined the bankruptcy system should
be a uniform, national system based upon the power of Congress, under article 4, section 8, clause
4 of the United States Constitution, to make uniform laws regarding bankruptcy, as well as because of the demands of a modern society.
29. Id. at 171.
[The determination of] exemptions has worked unfairly; it has, contrary to the goals of
federal bankruptcy legislation, allowed some creditors to be preferred over others and
caused substantial nonuniformity. It has probably also been responsible for some of the
dissatisfaction with the bankruptcy process. For example, in states where there are excessive exemptions, creditors have difficulty understanding a system that allows a debtor to
retain property of a value of several hundred thousand dollars', while at the same time
obtaining a discharge which precludes recovery of the creditors' claims. But it is not only
creditors who are dissatisfied; since state procedures must be complied with to perfect exemptions, the right to an exemption is often lost through mistake or inadvertence. In such a
case, it is understandable that the debtor might fault the system rather than himself.
id.
30. Id. at 71.
31. Id. at 171.
32. byId.
Published
eCommons, 1984

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:2

As finally passed by Congress, the exemption provisions of section
522(b) reflected compromise. The House supported the commission's
proposal, 33 but the Senate believed that the states should still play a
role in determining exemptions. 3 ' The Senate's position led to the compromise "opt-out" provision.3"
Commentators differ in their analyses of the effects of the compromise, but most conclude the result is bizarre. One commentator concluded that because of the differences in exemption schemes between
states, the act did not establish an exemption policy.36 The commentator further opined that Congress had "utterly failed to effectuate any
'Congressional policy of a fresh start for a debtor.' ",31 The commentator reasoned that the idea of a fresh start is essentially a "joke" in
states that choose to opt out and then are stingy in allowing exemptions.3 8 Likewise, in states with very generous exemptory schemes, the
debtor has a leg up, rather than just a fresh start. 39 This second result
was the very issue which caused many senators to oppose the House bill
in the first place.'
Another commentator reasoned that section 522(d)-the federal
exemption list-and the opt-out provision are clearly not mutually supportive. "1 This conclusion rests on the presumption that Congress intended section 522(d) to be a "model" for state exemption schemes if
the state chose to opt out. "2 If this was the intent of Congress, then the
opt-out provision is inapposite to providing the debtor with a fresh
start.'3 The opt-out provision allows the state to maintain an antiquarian system."'
When a state has opted out from the federal scheme of exemptions, the state controls the level of exemption. Therefore, if a debtor's
state has opted out and has not updated its exemption schedule, the
debtor will notice little change between the old and new federal bankruptcy systems. Under the 1978 Act, all of the debtor's property is first

33.

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3.

34. See infra notes 67-69.
35. See infra notes 67-69.
36. Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption Rights under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L.
REV. 769, 801-02 (1980) (emphasis in original).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. id.
40. Id.
41. Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29
CATH. U.L. REV. 843, 865 (1980).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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placed into the bankruptcy estate.4 5 Then, under section 522, property
is exempted out in accordance with one of two different
schemes"6-property specified in section 522(d) 47 (the federal exemptory scheme), or alternatively, property specified by state and local law
and any property which would be exempt under federal provisions
other than section 522(d). 4 '
Under the 1898 Act,49 exempt property was never placed into the
bankruptcy estate; the issue of exemption centered around what indeed
was "exempt" property. 50 Exempt property under the 1898 Act was to
be determined by the nonbankruptcy laws of the United States or of
the respective state of domicile of the bankrupt debtor. 5 The plain
wording of the 1898 Act stated that it did not affect what the states
allowed as exemptions. 52 This provision effectively caused exempt property to be determined by the respective state, rather than the federal
statute.
With respect to exemptions, there can be very little difference in
result between the 1898 Act and the 1978 Act. Although section
522(b) of the 1978 Act could operate to increase the variety of exemption schedules available to bankrupts, the opt-out provision, if exercised, could operate to nullify any increased level of exemption found in
the federal scheme but not in the state scheme.
Section 522(f) is unique in that it had no predecessor within the
1898 Act.53 Section 522(f) is also unique in that through its operation
the debtor can nullify certain secured interests of the debtor's secured
creditors, thereby increasing the scope of exemption available to him or
her.54 The commission recognized that exemptions from the bankruptcy
estate would of themselves not necessarily "insure that the debtor will
be able to retain the basic means of survival. ' 55 This is because per-

45. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 376.
46. II U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 353.
47. II U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 353.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(1) (1982).
49. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
50. Hertz, supra note 10, at 340.
51. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). The 1898 Act stated that "this Act shall not
affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws in
force at the time of the filing of the petition .
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982).
55. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 169.
Published
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fected security interests would escape the bankruptcy estate hotchpot
since the secured creditor is able to repossess the collateral from the
debtor if payment is not made, and thus defeat the bankruptcy
5
trustee. 1
If the debtor's property is of a type that is basic to survival and
rehabilitation as a productive member of society (e.g., household goods,
tools of trade, or wearing apparel), and this property is subject to a
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest, then the exemption provisions of section 522 will not be adequate to provide the debtor
with the means for a fresh start.5 7 Therefore, the commission saw a
clear need for a mechanism, such as section 522(f), designed to avoid
certain secured interests which if otherwise allowed would deprive the
debtor of the means for a fresh start. 8
The scope5 9 of section 522(f) is not excessively generous, nor does
it promote exemptions which are contrary to the spirit of the general
exemptory provision, section 522(d). 60 The debtor receives no exemptions beyond what he or she would have been entitled to, absent a judicial or nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest of a
creditor."1
Ohio is one of thirty-six states 2 which have decided to exercise6"
the opt-out provisions of section 522(b)(1) and provide its citizens with
a state developed schedule of exemptions.6 4 Generally, the Ohio exemption provisions have been updated to reflect a more realistic appraisal
of what type and how much property a bankrupt needs to retain to get

56. I1 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333,
376.
57. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 169. The commission also believed that nonpossessory secured interests in items basic to survival were primarily used as threats to coerce payment, because the creditor rarely intends to take possession. Id.
58. Id., Part II, at 130.
59. See supra note 8.
60. II U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982).
61. Id. § 522(f).
62. The following states have opted out of the federal scheme of exemptions: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 3 W.
COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.02, at 522-12 n.4a (15th ed. 1984).
63. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.662 (Page 1981). Section 2329.662 of the Ohio Revised
Code provides that "this state specifically does not authorize debtors who are domiciled in this
state to exempt the property specified in the 'Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978'...." Id. (This
provision is to be repealed effective Jan. 1, 1986, unless extended by other legislation. 1984 Ohio
Legis. Serv. 5-39 (Baldwin)).
64. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1981).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss2/7
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back on his or her feet. 6 5 The character and magnitude of exemptions
allowed by section 2329.66 of the Ohio Revised Code are in keeping
with the spirit of providing the debtor with the means for a fresh start.
However, it appears Ohio places the secured creditor's interest in obtaining payment ahead of the state's interest in rehabilitating the bankrupt debtor. Section 2329.661(C) of the Ohio Revised Code does not
allow avoidance of a lien by an exemption. 6 If valid, this provision
negates the restorative provisions of section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
Thus the kernel of conflict emerges. The core issue is whether the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 empowered the states to opt out from
the restorative or avoidance provisions of section 522(f), as well as the
federal scheme of exemptions provided in section 522(b). 7 It is clear
from the legislative history of section 522 that a state cannot, in the
extreme, opt out to the point of providing no exemptions and still fulfill
the intent of Congress.6 8 However, the extent to which a state may
exercise its right to opt out still remains to be decided by a number of

courts.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Intent of Congress

The background and history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 make it clear that the intent of Congress in embarking on an
overhaul of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was to promote uniformity in
treatment of the bankrupt debtor and to align the treatment of the
debtor with the social and economic thinking of the mid-twentieth cen-

65. Note, H.B. 674: Ohio Opts Out of the Federal Bankruptcy Exemptions and Revises Its
Bankruptcy Laws, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 461 (1980).
66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.661(C) (Page 1981). Section 2329.661(C) of the Ohio
Revised Code states that "[slection 2329.66 of the Revised Code does not affect or invalidate any
sale, contract of sale, conditional sale, security interest, or pledge of any personal property or any
lien created thereby." Id.
67. It should be noted that whether the states can opt out of using the federal scheme of
exemptions is not at issue. That issue was addressed in In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 818 (1982). The debtor in Sullivan attacked the constitutionality of the
opt-out provision of section 522(b)(1), and Illinois' action thereunder, on the basis of lack of
uniformity, which is required by article 1, section 8, clause 4 of th; United States Constitution,
and on the basis of an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power to the states. Id. at
1131-32. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that uniformity need only be geographical
in nature and not "true" uniformity for each individual debtor. Id. at 1135. Addressing the petitioner's contention that section 522(b)(1) was an unconstitutional delegation of congressional
power, the court stated that the congressional power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws was a
power to be exercised or not exercised. Id. at 1137. Therefore, allowing the states to establish
nonuniform laws of bankruptcy was not a delegation of power, but merely a refusal to exercise the
power. Id. at 1137-38.
68. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3.
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tury.6 9 Congress stated that the requirement for change was due to
three factors: (1) bankruptcies had increased at the rate of 1000% per
year for each of the last twenty years; (2) more than one-fourth of
United States bankruptcy referees had difficulty in administering the
current system and had made recommendations for improvement; and
(3) the rapid increase in credit was complicating the administration of
the bankruptcy system.7" Congress understood that the federal government and commercial communities lacked the expertise to find the
common philosophical thread which would tie together the issues buried in these three factors; therefore, the Commission on the Bankruptcy
71
Laws of the United States was created.
The commission's product-proposed changes to the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 7 2 -fulfilled the commission's charter to provide Congress
with a strawman position, 73 and by definition was in tune with congressional intent. The commission also provided Congress with a philosophical justification for the position.7 4 With regard to debtor exemptions,
the commission proposed promoting the goals of uniformity and debtor
rehabilitation through minimum, standard levels of exemption. 75 In a
sense this proposal was a statement of "congressional intent."
The exemption provisions proposed by the commission were then
modified by the House, and the House Judiciary Committee reported
H.R. 8200 on September 8, 1977.7' H.R. 8200 reflected an intent by
the House to provide a federal floor for exemption, but also allowed the
debtor to choose either the exemptions provided by federal or state
nonbankruptcy law if these exemptions were more favorable to him or
her.77 When H.R. 6,78 the predecessor to H.R. 8200, was introduced, a
commission member told the House that a federal scheme of exemptions was needed because the states' schemes of exemptions were
grossly out of tune with the times. 79 The House Report accompanying
H.R. 8200 stated that "[this bill] enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start." 80 There was no provision in H.R. 8200 allowing the

69.
70.
71.

Id.
Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
Id.

72.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at Part II.

73.

Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.

74.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 170.
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Id.
H.R. 6, 95th Cong., IstSess. (1977).
123 CONG. REC. 218 (1977) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 126.
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states to opt out from the federal scheme of exemptions.8 1 Therefore,
when H.R. 8200 was reported from the House, "the intent of Congress" (the Senate had not yet expressed an intent) was to provide
bankrupt debtors with a fresh start through a federal scheme of minimum exemptions. Debtors could elect exemptions controlled by
nonbankruptcy law if they so desired.
In July 1978, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 2266.2
Unlike H.R. 8200, S. 2266 did not provide the bankrupt debtor with a
minimum level of exemption, but provided that exemption would be
governed by state law-no change from the 1898 Act. 3 The committee's report stated that allowing state determination of exemption levels
would still provide the debtor with the means for a fresh start, but
would avoid "instant affluence, as would be possible under the provisions of H.R. 8200.''84 Consequently, the "intent of Congress" with respect to exemption, as expressed in S.2266 and accompanying legislative history, was to provide debtors with the means for a fresh start,
while allowing the states the option of determining the scope of the
means.
Section 522(b) is, therefore, a compromise between the schemes
addressed in H.R. 8200 and S.2266. The substance of the compromise
was addressed in floor statements by congressmen who played a key
role in developing the compromise. The statements made in the Senate
acknowledge the obvious fact that the states will be able to determine
exemption levels if they so choose.85 But the statements also indicate an
understanding that the compromise would result in states evaluating
and upgrading their exemption schemes to be more generous than the
federal exemption scheme, rather than less generous.86 No statement

81. See supra note 76.
82. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
83. Id. § 522. This was despite strong appeal by many witnesses for a scheme of minimum
federal exemptions. Attorney General Griffin Bell, the Commercial Law League of America, the
National Consumer Finance Association, and the National Bankruptcy Conference all argued for
a federal scheme of exemptions and were opposed to the opt-out provisions of S. 2266. Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: Hearingson S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
84. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5792 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. Senator Thurmond stated in debate that
"[t]he fairer way is to allow a fresh start, but on a limited basis." 124 CONG. REc. 28,260 (1978)
(statement of Sen. Thurmond).
85. For example, Senator DeConcini made the following statement: "In the area of exemptions, it was agreed that a Federal exemption standard will be codified but the States could at any
time reject them in which case the State exemption laws would continue to prevail." 124 CONG.
REC. 33,990 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
86. When introducing the bill in the Senate, Senator Wallop made the following comment
concerning exemptions:
In the area of exemptions, we have won an important victory for the rights of States to
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indicates that a state can nullify the effect of section 522(f) by opting
out. On the contrary, after noting that a state may opt out, one congressman subsequently commented that the code allows a debtor to
avoid liens on selected household goods. "7
The floor statements indicate that the "fresh start" concept survived the compromise. Implicit in each statement is an acknowledgement that the debtor would always be entitled to some level of exemption. Furthermore, it is possible to read into the compromise the
understanding of many members of Congress that state exemption
levels would indeed be more generous than the federal scheme of exemptions if the state exercised the opt-out provision. 8
Unlike section 522(b)(1), there was neither disagreement nor compromise between the House and Senate over the provisions of section
522(f). The commission recognized "that exemptions alone will not insure that the debtor will be able to retain the basic means of survival." 89 To increase the effectiveness of the exemption policy, the commission proposed that unsecured creditors not be allowed to enforce a
waiver of a federal exemption. 90 The commission also proposed that
exemptions of the necessities of rehabilitation (e.g., household-type
goods) should be allowed when the necessities of rehabilitation were
encumbered by nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests.9 1

determine exemptions for the debtors of their States[.] Reduced Federal exemptions will be
provided by the law but States by legislation may elect not to have them apply [to] their
debtors. This option is most important since many States, such as my own, Wyoming, have
been responsive to the needs of debtors and have liberalized exemptions frequently in
recent years.
124 CONG. REc. 33,992 (1978) (statement of Sen. Wallop) (emphasis added).
87. When introducing the bill in the House, Congressman Butler made the following
statement:
In general, the individual debtor is given increased protection and afforded a meaningful
fresh start. The [C]ode provides uniform Federal exemptions which may be selected by the
debtor as an alternative to exemptions under State law unless state law forbids that choice.
Strict limits are placed on reaffirmation of consumer debts and the debtor may invalidate
liens on certain household items. Finally, the debtor may redeem collateral from a lien.
124 CONG. REC. 32,418 (1978) (statement of Rep. Butler) (emphasis added).
88. In re Neiheisel, 32 Bankr. 146, 162 (D. Utah 1983). The court in Neiheisel provides an
excellent analysis of the development of section 522. The court made the following statement:
The exemptions compromise enacted by Section 522(b)(1) was not the resolution of a
battle between forces favoring and opposing a fresh start. Both the House and the Senate
recognized a fresh start as a desirable goal of bankruptcy law. Their disagreement centered
on whether Congress or the states should possess authority to fix exemptions. The House
feared state stinginess. The Senate feared state munificence. By permitting states to forbid
federal exemptions, the compromise left decision making authority on types and amounts
of exemptions with the states.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 169.
90. Id. at 170.
91. Id.
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Underlying section 522(f) was congressional concern that creditors
often take a secured interest in all of the debtor's personal goods, the
debtor waives any right to exemption he may have, and then the creditor uses threats of repossession to coerce payment.9 2 The debtor's collateral usually has little resale value; consequently, creditors infrequently repossess. 93 However, the unsophisticated debtor does not know
this and is at a disadvantage in dealing with the more knowledgeable
creditor.94 Section 522(f) was intended to ameliorate this problem.
The commission's proposal for section 522(f) was adopted by both
the Senate and the House; their respective comments on section 522(f)
are identical. 95 It is reasonable to conclude that both the Senate and
the House agreed with the substance of section 522(f) because of their
support for the goal section 522(f) was designed to achieve-that is, to
insure the debtor has the bare necessities for a fresh start.
B.

Goals of the Bankruptcy System Are Not Being Met

Of concern now is how the states and courts have pursued the
goal-the intent of Congress-of ensuring that bankrupt debtors have
the means for a fresh start. Thirty-six states have enacted opt-out provisions in accordance with section 522(b)(1). 96 This means that either
there is conflict or the potential for conflict in thirty-six states with
respect to the applicability of section 522(f). A review of the leading
cases which have resolved the opt-out-section 522(f) conflict indicates
there are a variety of different approaches to resolving the problem.
McManus v. Avco FinancialServices, Inc.,9 7 was the first decision
rendered by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals which addressed
the conflict between opt-out provisions and section 522(f). In McManus, the court heard consolidated appeals of two different United
States District Court cases adversely ruling on the operative nature of

92. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 127.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 362; SENATE REPORT, supra note 84, at 76 (under
subsection (e)). The House and Senate reports introducing their respective bills each stated the
following:
Subsection (f)protects the debtor's exemptions, his discharge, and thus his fresh start
by permitting him to avoid certain liens on exempt property. The debtor may avoid a judicial lien on any property to the extent that the property could have been exempted in the
absence of the lien, and may similarly avoid a nonpurchase-money security interest in certain household and personal goods. The avoiding power is independent of any waiver of
exemptions.
Id. (emphasis added).
96. See supra note 62.
97. 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).

Published by eCommons, 1984

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:2

section 522(f),98 in the face of Louisiana's election to opt out from the
federal exemptory scheme and disallow exemption of household goods
secured by chattel mortgages. 9 The McManus court found that the
only liens a debtor could avoid were those that would deny an exemption allowed by section 522(b); 10 it also held that section 522() was
not a separate exemption statute. 10 1 The court then reasoned that if the
state has opted out from the federal scheme of exemptions and the
state scheme does not allow an exemption of property secured by a
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest, then section
522(0 cannot work to give the debtor an avoidance allowance.102 The
majority opinion in McManus concluded that section 522() does not
survive after a state has opted out. The court further held that the
state's approach to exemptions excludes those offered by section
522(0.103
The dissent in McManus presented a view that is more in keeping
with the intent of Congress to provide the debtor with the means for a
fresh start. Judge Dyer explained that the words "notwithstanding any
waiver of exemptions" in section 522(f) should be given their plain English meaning, that is, to return the debtor to the position he or she
enjoyed prior to the action of a waiver.104 The judge also concluded
that "any" waiver means just that. Therefore, waivers effected by operation of law, such as were at issue in McManus, could not deny a
debtor an exemption to which he or she otherwise would have been
entitled.1 0 5
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the McManus reasoning in evaluating an opt-out-section 522() conflict with respect to the

98. Id.
99. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3885 (West 1979).
100. McManus, 681 F.2d at 355.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 357.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 358. Judge Dyer further stated that:
When the debtors entered the creditors' office they enjoyed an exemption under Louisiana law from seizure and sale of their household goods; and when they left the office they
could no longer claim an exemption for those goods solely because they had improvidently
granted a security interest to the creditors covering such goods. I fail to see how this could
be characterized as anything but a waiver of exemptions, subject to the avoiding power
found in § 522(0.
If the majority opinion correctly states the law, any state can by statute preclude a
debtor from availing himself of the loan [sic) avoidance provisions found in § 522(0. I
cannot conclude that Congress intended to allow states to do this.
105.

Id.
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bankruptcy statutes of Georgia 1 6 and Tennessee 07 in Pine v. Credithrift of America, Inc.'08 The Pine court held that "debtors may avoid
liens only on that property which the states have declared to be exempt."10 9 The court found no ambiguity in section 522.110 The court
recognized that supporting the "fresh start" concept would lead to a
different result;"' however, it held that the clear language of the optout provision took precedence over any rehabilitative provisions of the
code. 2 This court criticized the courts below which had relied on legislative history in determining that section 522(f) was still viable after
a state had opted out from the federal scheme of exemptions. 1 8 The
court took the position that the legislative history should not be con14
sulted because the language of the statute was clear.
The problem with the Pine line of reasoning is that the statute
obviously is not clear. If it were clear, the frequency of litigation of this
issue would certainly be less than what it has been. It is noteworthy,
however, that the McManus court did acknowledge that the legislative
history (if it were proper to consult legislative history) could support a
different result.115
A view opposite to McManus and Pine was taken by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In Maddox v. Southern Discount Co., 116 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated
Georgia's bankruptcy statute. The court did not find, as did the Pine
court, that Georgia's statute expressly denied the debtor the avoidance
power of section 522(f)."11 Consequently, the court did not have to decide whether Georgia had the constitutional authority to deny its citizens use of section 522(f). However, the court did state that Judge
Dyer's dissent in McManus was persuasive, and the court might adopt
Judge Dyer's position if faced with the decision.""
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1601 (1980) (recodified as § 44-13-100 (1982)).
107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (1980).
108. 717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1711 (1984).
109. Id. at 284.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Pine court stated that:
The courts below erred because they placed almost exclusive emphasis on legislative history
supporting the original version of § 522 as adopted by the House of Representatives. That
version was not the law that was finally passed. The legislative history which supports the
rejected version isnot particularly persuasive on the meaning of the final
version.

Id.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
McManus, 681 F.2d at 357 n.7.
713 F.2d 1526 (1lth Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 1530. It should be noted that Judge Dyer is an Eleventh Circuit judge who was
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Numerous United States Bankruptcy Courts have also taken positions opposite to McManus and Pine.?9 These courts generally support
Judge Dyer's position.12 0 The cases and decisions which follow indicate
that these bankruptcy courts have a better understanding of the intent
of Congress in overhauling the bankruptcy system in 1978.
In Locarno v. Sachs,12 1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Maryland evaluated the constitutionally acceptable extent to which Maryland could opt out from the federal scheme of exemptions. The court stated, in evaluating Maryland's bankruptcy law' 22
after the state had opted out from the federal scheme of exemptions,
that when Congress enacted the detailed list of exemptions of section
522(d), the states were "implicitly bound . . . to adopt a corresponding
scheme of exemptions. 1 23 In holding that Maryland must enact an exemptory scheme similar to the federal scheme, the Locarno court went
beyond implicitly stating that section 522(f) is operative after a state
has opted out. If the state can opt out and then negate the federal
policy of giving debtors the means for a fresh start, then there is little
need for section 522.
In Strain v. Valley Bank,124 the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Idaho evaluated whether Idaho law1 25 could constitutionally nullify section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that Idaho could not deny debtors the lien avoidance provisions
of section 522(f) because to do so would be an usurpation of congressional power to make uniform bankruptcy laws.' The court further
concluded that "the congressional intent in enacting 522(f) is so clear
that direct conflict with federal law exists here.' 2 7
Even when bankruptcy courts are not evaluating a direct constitutional challenge to a state's nullification of section 522(f), the courts

sitting on
119.
120.
121.
122.

the McManus panel by assignment.
See infra note 138.
See infra note 138.
23 Bankr. 622 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504 (1981).

123. Locarno, 23 Bankr. at 630.
124. 16 Bankr. 797 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982).
125. IDAHO CODE § 11-607 (Supp. 1981).
126. Strain, 16 Bankr. at 798.
127. Id. at 799. See also Berry v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 33 Bankr. 351 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1983). North Carolina bankruptcy law denied the bankrupt debtor use of the federal
"laundry list" of exemptions. The statute also stated that the debtor would waive his or her right
to selected exemptions if certain filing procedures were not followed (this is a state statutory
waiver). The Berry court held that the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution would
prevent any state from enacting legislation to deprive a debtor of the lien avoidance provisions
extended by section 522(f). Id. at 353.
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have believed it important to comment on this issue.' 28 An excellent
example of a bankruptcy court's concern for the integrity of the bankruptcy system is contained in the decision in Falck v. Household Finance Corp.12 9 In Falck, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Central District of California evaluated whether a California statute
allowing a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest to impair an exemption taken by the debtor under state law could be defeated by section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.' 30 The bankrupt husband in Falck claimed exemptions under the federal scheme, and the
bankrupt wife claimed exemptions under the state scheme.' 3' But unlike the Bankruptcy Code, California debtor-creditor law subordinates
an exemption to enforcement of a valid lien.' 32 The court supported the
subordination, but only to the extent it impaired the wife's exemption
under the state scheme.' 33 The Falck court relied"" on the analyses
found in In re Babcock'35 and Panesky v. CIT Financial Services,'36
both holding that state law could preempt section 522(f) when a state
had opted out of the federal scheme. 3 7 But the Falck court went on to
conclude that in the instant case, there was no danger that section
522(f) would be completely overpowered, as the debtors had the option
of selecting the federal or state scheme of exemptions. 3 8 In other
words, the court agreed with the logic of Babcock and Panesky, but
believed that it was important to not deny the operative "spirit" of section 522(f).
The decisions for and against section 522(f) viability do not bear a
direct relationship to geographical location and seem to be varied
throughout the country. Bankruptcy courts, which are closest to understanding and implementing the bankruptcy system, have predominately
supported the survival of section 522(f) after states opt out. 39 Most
128. See infra notes 129 & 138 and accompanying text.
129. 12 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 836.
132. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.1 (West 1980) (repealed 1983).
133. Falck, 12 Bankr. at 838.
134. Id.
135. 9 Bankr. 475 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981).
136. 5 Bankr. 201 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
137. Babcock, 9 Bankr. 475; Panesky, 5 Bankr. 201.
138. Falck, 12 Bankr. at 838. See also In re Parrish, 19 Bankr. 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982)
The Parrish court evaluated whether the exemptions allowed by Colorado law were constitutionally in keeping with the Bankruptcy Code. The court held that Colorado insolvency law does not
void the exemption of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests. Consequently, there
was no conflict between § 522(f) and Colorado's policy of denying its bankrupts the exemptions
contained in § 522(d). On the contrary, the court stated that if a state chooses to opt out of the
federal scheme of exemptions, it must provide its citizens with a similar scheme of exemptions.
139. Representative cases supporting the survival of section 522(f) following state decisions
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bankruptcy courts in Ohio have held that section 522(f) cannot be
overpowered by Ohio opting out and specifically denying a debtor his or
her exemption of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests. "1 0 The rationale has routinely been that to hold otherwise would
be inconsistent with congressional intent and the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution. 41
However, a fairly recent Ohio bankruptcy court decision, Morelock v. All-Phase Electric Supply Co.,1" 2 seems to put distance between itself and the broad statements made about the viability of section 522(f) in previous decisions.1, 3 Morelock involved an attempt by
the debtor to exempt real estate from a judicial lien, as provided by
section 522(f)(1). 144 Rather than decide the issue by stating that an
Ohio statute could not overpower section 522(f), as previous courts had
done,1 45 the Morelock court found that Ohio had not attempted to impair exemption for property encumbered by judicial lien,1 46 because
section 2329.66 of the Ohio Revised Code does not address judicial
liens. 14 7 Therefore, there was no question about the viability of section
522(f). This decision appears to be an effort to align with the position
taken by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Pine.
C. The McManus Decision Is Incorrect
There are at least three ways for a court to resolve statutory ambiguity.' 48 First, it can declare that there is no statutory ambiguity." 9
This was the approach taken by the McManus court.' 50 Second, after
finding ambiguity, a court can look to the decisions on each side of an

to opt out include: Maddox, 713 F.2d 1526; Berry, 33 Bankr. 351; Locarno, 23 Bankr. 622;
Strain, 16 Bankr. 797; Falck, 12 Bankr. 835; In re Snellings, 10 Bankr. 949 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1981); Giles v. Credithrift of America Corp., 9 Bankr. 135 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); Cox v.
Blazer Financial Servs., Inc., 4 Bankr. 240 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). Representative cases holding
that § 522.(f) does not survive state opt-out decisions include: Pine, 717 F.2d 281; McManus, 681
F.2d 353; Babcock, 9 Bankr. 475; Panesky, 5 Bankr. 201.
140. See, e.g., Flege v. Akron City Hosp., 17 Bankr. 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Phillips
v. Household Finance Corp., 13 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Bowles, 8 Bankr. 394
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); Storer v. Thorp Credit Inc., 13 Bankr. I (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980);
Fisher v. Liberty Loan Corp., 6 Bankr. 206 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
141. See cases cited supra note 140.
142. 35 Bankr. 518 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
143. Id. at 520.
144. Id. at 518.
145. See supra note 140.
146. Morelock, 35 Bankr. at 520.
147. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page 1981).
148. See infra notes 149-52.
149. McManus, 681 F.2d 353.
150. Id. at 355.
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issue, and declare the majority position to be the most correct.' 51
Courts seldom openly acknowledge support for this approach. Third, it
can analyze the legislative history of the statute and attempt to determine what the legislature intended when the statute was enacted."5 2
The bankruptcy courts have consistently taken this approach;15 3 it has
logical appeal.
The evidence is certainly sufficient to establish that both the
House and the Senate were concerned that bankrupt debtors be provided with the means for a fresh start. This concern clearly pervades
the language of the House report introducing H.R. 8200,15 as well as
the Senate Judiciary Committee report accompanying S. 2266.15 Indeed, the Senate Judiciary Committee was not alone in supporting a
"fresh start" concept. 56 One senator commented in the Senate Finance
Committee report accompanying S. 2266 that the objective of the bill
is "to give the debtor a less encumbered 'fresh start' after bankruptcy.' 1 57 In quashing the challenge that the Bankruptcy Code's optout provision was an unconstitutional delegation of power, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Sullivan 58 stated that "the intention
of providing a 'fresh start' can only be attributed to the House."'1 59 This
statement is simply not supported. What is supported is that the Senate
believed it to be important that the states retain the right to set exemption levels if they so choose.'6 0 Allowing the states to set exemption
levels, and the goal of providing a debtor with the means for a fresh
start, theoretically are not mutually exclusive concepts. However, under
selective conditions, they have turned out to be so in practice.' 6 '
It may well be asked why there should be such extensive emphasis
on the intent of Congress. If it can be rationalized that the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 was not intended to ensure that debtors have the
means to rehabilitate themselves, then there is no problem with supporting the creditor's position over the debtor's. With this view of congressional intent, the ambiguity in the statute can be acknowledged and

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
Panesky,
opted out

See generally 17 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 166 (1974).
See generally id. § 145-46.
See supra note 139.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 84.
See CONG. REC., supra note 84; id., supra note 86; id., supra note 87.
S. REP. No. 1106, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978) (statement of Sen. Long).
680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1136.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 84.
See, e.g., Pine, 717 F.2d 281; McManus, 681 F.2d 353; Babcock, 9 Bankr. 475;
5 Bankr. 201 (all denying the debtor lien avoidance power after the respective state had
of the federal scheme of exemptions).
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resolved in favor of the creditor. But as has been noted, this view does
not make sense because it merely preserves the status quo.16 2 This view
is a non sequitur which, if accepted, means there was no reason to enact section 522. To adopt this position would be to acknowledge
that-to use the vernacular-the House was had. There is no support
for the extreme position of "zero" exemptions, which would seem to be
a result allowed under the McManus holding. Statutory construction
which allows this result is surely out of step with what Congress
intended.
Additional argument for the survival of section 522(f) after a state
opts out can be found in Cheeseman v. Nachman.'6 3 The court in
Cheeseman held that although a state had opted out from the federal
scheme of exemptions, the state's homestead exemption law164 could
not defeat the exemption provisions of section 522(m) of the Bankruptcy Code. 6 5 Specifically, section 522(m) allows both parties in a
joint bankruptcy to claim exemptions whether the exemptions are determined by state or federal law.16 6 The conflicting Virginia law 16 7 was
construed by the bankruptcy trustee to limit the state homestead exemption to one for each household."6 ' The Cheeseman court held that
the statutory construction proposed by the trustee would conflict with
69
section 522(m) and frustrate the intent of Congress.'
The holding in Cheeseman was relied upon by the appellant in
70
Sullivan1
in challenging the constitutionality of Illinois' exercise of
the section 522 opt-out power. The court in Sullivan, however, held
that section 522(b)(1) specifically gives a state the power to preempt
the federal scheme of exemptions. 71 Cheeseman was readily distinguished because that case addressed state defeat of a section of the
code-section 522(m)-separate from and not addressed in section
522(b)(1) opt-out language. 172 However, the Sullivan court did comment that section 522(b)(1) did not give a state the power to "abrogate
section 522(m).' 7 3 Common sense indicates that if a state cannot frus-

162. See, e.g., Vukowich, supra note 36; Comment, supra note 41, at 865.
163. 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981).
164. VA. CODE § 34-4 (Supp. 1980).
165. Cheeseman, 656 F.2d at 64.
166. 1I U.S.C. § 522(m) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 353.
167. VA. CODE § 34-4 (Supp. 1980).
168. Cheeseman, 656 F.2d 60.
169. Id.at 63-64.
170. Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131.
171. Id.at 1137.
172. Id.at 1136-37.
173. Id.at 1137.
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trate the intent of Congress with respect to section 522(m), then a state
should not be able to do so with respect to section 522(f).
It has been postulated that one motive for Senate opposition to
H.R. 8200 was concern that H.R. 8200 gave debtors a "head start"
rather than a "fresh start."" 4 Some may argue that this concern
should be the controlling factor in determining the intent of Congress
buried in the compromise and resulting statute. Even if this concern
were controlling, it strains the imagination to envision the debtor attaining "instant affluence" because the section 522(f) lien avoidance
provisions are allowed to overpower a state's penurious denial of those
protections.
The decisions in McManus and Pine are incorrect. These decisions
ignore the ambiguity in the Bankruptcy Code which surfaces when a
state opts out under section 522(b)(1) and concurrently attempts to
deny to its citizens the restorative lien avoidance provisions of section
522(f). By failing to find ambiguity, those courts foreclosed any inquiry
into the legislative history to determine just what Congress intended
when these two sections were enacted. Consequently, the McManus
holding allows a state to defeat the clear and well-documented intent of
both the House and Senate to ensure that the bankrupt debtor has a
fresh start after discharge from bankruptcy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the first major overhaul
of the nation's bankruptcy code in forty years. The overhaul was undertaken because bankruptcy laws had not kept pace with the development
of a modern, urban, nonagrarian society. Formerly, the future of a
bankrupt debtor was placed in the hands of the debtor's respective state
insolvency laws; consequently, the nation's bankruptcy system was especially nonuniform.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the product of detailed
study, analysis, and proposal by some of the best and most knowledgeable minds on the subject in the country. Pervasive throughout the entire
study, proposal, and bill drafting process was the idea that the new act
would ensure that bankrupt debtors would be left, after discharge, with
the bare necessities for making a fresh start. The concern was to get
bankrupts back on their feet as productive members of society.
Ultimate compromise between the Senate and House allowing the
states to set their own exemption levels by opting out from the federal
exemptory scheme did not destroy the idea of providing the bankrupt
with the means for a fresh start. In fact, the idea was preserved to

174.

Vukowich, supra note 36.
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some extent by the enactment of section 522(f)-a provision which allows the debtor to nullify certain liens which would otherwise impair
exemption of fresh start necessities. However, the compromise resulted
in ambiguity in the statute. The statutory language did not prevent the
possibility that a state, through the exercise of its opt-out power, could
nullify section 522 in its entirety. The leading case of McManus v.
Avco Financial Services, Inc.17 5 permits this undesirable result. McManus denies the existence of any ambiguity in the statute, and consequently, finds no necessity to explore legislative intent. This ostrich-like
approach resolves nothing.
Section 522(f) can also be read as overpowering any negative effects of state law on lien avoidance resulting from state opt-out. This
better reasoned approach was expressed by the dissent in McManus
and by many of the bankruptcy courts, most especially the bankruptcy
courts in Ohio. These courts have concluded that the statute is ambiguous; therefore, they have analyzed legislative history in detail to determine legislative intent and a statutory construction which supports this
intent.
When ,a given statutory construction of an ambiguous statute will
support clearly defined legislative intent, it is only common sense to
apply that statutory construction. To do otherwise is to usurp the legislative function. In circuits which have not adopted the McManus holding, courts should evaluate and apply the better reasoned construction
developed by the dissent in McManus and provide bankrupt debtors
with the means for the "fresh start" mandated by Congress.
Arnold D. Patchin

175.

681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).
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